I am currently working on three main projects: 

Fundamentality: what are the constraints on metaphysical explanation? How do these constraints impact various views about what is fundamental, such as physicalism, generalism, wavefunction realism, and logical atomism?

Probability: I am working on revitalizing the classical approach to probability, by developing and defending the view that physical probabilities are determined by a uniform measure over the space of physically possible worlds.

Physicalism: how, exactly, does the success of physics make physicalism a plausible view? And what is the best version of physicalism – is it formulated in terms of grounding, identification, or some combination of the two?

Publications

  • Against Grounding Physicalism (Journal of Philosophy, forthcoming). Argues that grounding physicalists cannot solve the ‘T-shirt problem’ (the problem of providing compact physical-phenomenal laws). Final version

  • Generalism Without Generation (Journal of Philosophy, 2025). Distinguishes two versions of generalism, and argues that only one of them is able to provide satisfactory explanations for truths about individuals. Final version

  • Overdetermination and Causal Connections (Philosophical Studies, 2024). Shows that existing compatibilist approaches to overdetermination face counterexamples, and argues that compatibilists should focus on the relations between causal connections. Final version

  • Two Approaches to Metaphysical Explanation (Nous, 2024). Distinguishes two forms of metaphysical explanation – one based on generation and the other on reduction. Argues that there are important differences between them and that we need both. Final version

  • Cohesive Proportionality (Philosophical Studies, 2023). Argues that the idea that causes should be proportional to their effects should be rescued from the disjunction problem by appeal to the notion of cohesion. Final version

  • Proportionality in Causation: Parts I & II (Philosophy Compass, 2023). Surveys various formulations of the idea that causes are ‘proportional’ to their effects, their applications and their challenges. Part I Part II

  • Grounding Identity in Existence (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2023). Defends the view that the facts about which things are identical and distinct are grounded in the facts about what exists. Final version

  • Grounded Shadows, Groundless Ghosts (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2022). Defends wave-function realism ­– the view that the quantum-mechanical wave-function is a fundamental field in a high-dimensional space – against the objection that it cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the manifest image. Final version

Works-in-progress

  • A paper arguing from the Law of Large Numbers to the conclusion that physical probabilities are necessarily uniform. Draft

  • A paper exploring the view that a conjunctive proposition just is/are its conjuncts (rather than being grounded in its conjuncts). Draft

  • Probability from Symmetry. Develops and defends a version of the classical approach to probability, on which probabilities are determined by a uniform measure over the space of physical possibilities.

  • The Nomic Exclusion Argument for Physicalism. Argues that the exclusion argument should be formulated in terms of laws rather than causation.

  • Logical Atomism. Motivates and develops a particular version of the view that fundamental reality is logically simple. (With Verónica Gómez)